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A Review of Supreme Court Decisions
on Aid to Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education
By PATRICK S. DUFFY*
THE Supreme Court said in 1925 that parents may, in the discharge
of their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their children
to a religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular
educational requirements which the state has power to impose.' Suc-
ceeding opinions on state aid to nonpublic schools have acknowledged
that landmark decision and accompanied it with an endorsement of
nonpublic education. Thus, we read in the 1968 textbook case of
Board of Education v. Allen:
2
Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judg-
ments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recog-
nition that private education has played and is playing a significant
and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, com-
petence, and experience.
3
In its most recent decision in this area, the Court was equally com-
plimentary to church-related schools:
Finally, nothing we have said can be construed to disparage the
role of church-related elementary and secondary schools in our
national life. Their contribution has been and is enormous. 4
This same Court also took cognizance of the fiscal crises confronting
nonpublic schools in these words:
Nor do we ignore their economic plight in a period of rising costs
and expanding need. Taxpayers generally have been spared vast
sums by the maintenance of these educational institutions by re-
ligious organizations, largely by the gifts of faithful adherents. 5
* A.B., 1950, Carlow College, Ireland; Ph.D., 1966, Stanford; J.D., 1970,
Catholic University.
1. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
2. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
3. Id. at 247.
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
5. Id.
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Thus, while acknowledging the constitutional right of these schools
to exist, their national merit, economic crises, and general benefit to all
taxpayers, such factors have not been the issues before the Court in
state aid to nonpublic school cases. Rather, the sole question is whether
state aid to these schools is consistent with the mandate of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment. The overriding problem of fed-
eral or state aid to nonpublic schools remains a constitutional one;6
that is to say, would such aid violate the United States Constitution?
To answer this question requires a review of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, the subject of standing to sue, and
pertinent church-state constitutional decisions. Consideration of al-
ternatives to federal or state aid to nonpublic schools also warrants the




Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .... 7
The formula in this first section of the First Amendment has been
a guiding principle in church-state affairs for the past 180 years. "Es-
tablishment" and "free exercise" are the two key elements in the de-
ceptively simple sixteen word equation. They govern two categories
of school cases: those involving religion in the public school and those
involving the use of public funds for nonpublic education.
Cases do not always clearly fall under either the establishment
clause or the free exercise clause and any generalization in this regard
must be tempered by a warning against oversimplification. Although
cases involving aid to sectarian schools are generally treated as estab-
lishment cases, nevertheless, it has been argued vigorously that the free
exercise rights of parents who wish to have their children educated in
sectarian schools are infringed when aid equivalent to that given to
public schools is denied sectarian schools.8 Categorization is further
complicated when a determination has to be made as to what constitutes
religion,9 or when a distinction must be made between primary religious
6. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 520-29 (rev. ed. 1967).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. See R. DINAN, RELIGION, rTHE CouRTs, AND PuBLIc POLIcY 192 (1963).
9. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), where the Court declared un-
constitutional a Maryland law requiring a profession of belief in the existence of God
before one could hold public office. Mr. Justice Black listed both ethical culture and
and secular effects.1"
History is often invoked to answer these questions. It has been
said that "[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or
given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the
First Amendment."'" Considerable judicial opinion and periodical
commentary have had liberal recourse to the history of the First
Amendment for the purpose of reinforcing the doctrines, theories, and
tests which they espouse. These scholarly endeavors have been beset
by two major problems-namely, the scant documentation of early
legislative history and the internal inconsistencies of available data.' 2
In his celebrated historical outline of the First Amendment, Justice
Brennan was constrained to observe: "[O]n our precise problem the
historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be
found to support either side of the proposition,"' 3 and to warn: "A
too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues
of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected .... "-1
Obviously, the Founding Fathers did not foresee the expanding
and interrelating functions of both government and religion or the suc-
ceeding church-state issues which would ensue. Yet, the political, re-
ligious, and social history of the First Amendment era illuminates at
least the original climate and "historic purpose of the First Amend-
ment."' There is a general concensus that the free exercise clause en-
trusted to us a delicate respect for the inviolability of conscience and
that the establishment clause was designed to protect us from the evils
of a government establishment of religion. In the words of a contempo-
rary legal authority on the First Amendment:
secular humanism as religions. Id. at 495 n.l1 (dictum). See also United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (the Supreme Court in granting draft exemptions to
humanists recognized the movement as a religion even though there was no belief in a
Supreme Being).
10. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 448 (1961), wherein a secular ef-
fect independent of religion is attributed to Sunday closing laws; Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (the secular effect of protecting children going to and
from church schools from the very hazards of traffic). But see School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
11. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
12. See Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An His-
torical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1401-02 (1966).
13. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. Jones, Church-State Relations: Our Constitutional Heritage, in RELIGION
AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 163 (H. Stahmer ed. 1963).
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History should furnish the informed perspective needed to fashion
a rational constitutional standard that serves several purposes, in-
cluding cognizance of the evil consequences feared by the framers,
appreciation of values presently cherished, and capability of con-
sistent application to the relevant problems. 16
Fourteenth Amendment
The free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amend-
ment were prohibitions directly addressed to Congress. However, the
Supreme Court applied the religious clauses to state action through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7  They were con-
sidered to belong in that core category of rights "of the very essence of
a scheme of ordered liberty,"' 8 encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment. All of the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment-
"abridgment of privileges or immunities," "due process," and "equal
protection"-have been pleaded but thus far the Court has only rec-
ognized the due process clause for the purpose of securing religious
liberty without specific reliance on the First Amendment. In the
celebrated case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'9 the Supreme Court
held that a state statute requiring all children to attend a public school
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the liberty of
parents in the education of their children and depriving private schools
of their property without due process.
Although the equal protection clause has been better known for
its application to segregation cases in education,20 it is appearing in
church-state cases with recurring frequency. Where aid to nonpublic
schools has been denied, an equal protection of sectarian school chil-
dren and parents argument has been advanced without reference to the
First Amendment.2' Opponents of aid to nonpublic schools now plead
the equal protection clause as a matter of course on the grounds that
private and sectarian schools discriminate in religious, race, and by
social and economic criteria.22
16. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF.
L. RFv. 260, 264 (1968).
17. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (establish-
ment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause).
18. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21. See School Dist. v. Kelley (Mich., filed Nov. 12, 1970).
22. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd and re-
In effect, restrictions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
must be examined together with restrictions of a state constitution and
its amendments when deciding the validity of state enactments involv-
ing aid to nonpublic education or public school involvement with re-
ligion.
Standing to Sue
Until 1968, Frothingham v. Mellon23 barred suits by federal tax-
payers challenging the validity of government spending. In 1968 the
forty-year-old precedent was limited by the decision in Flast v. Cohen.2
The Frothingham rule, essentially a judicial gatekeeping policy, had
distinguished litigants who had a substantial stake from those whose
interests were de minimis in the issues they sought to bring to trial. The
Flast Court concluded that such a bar, admitting of degrees of interest,
cannot be absolute and for standing to sue they fashioned a new cri-
terion which has a twofold requirement-namely, that there be a logi-
cal nexus or relation between the status of the litigant on the one hand
and both the challenged legislative enactment and the precise nature
of the alleged constitutional infringement on the other. Thus, for in-
stance, in a Pennsylvania case 25 the lower court eliminated all but one
plaintiff in its narrow test of standing, and he survived by virtue of the
fact that he had attended the harness races and had accordingly con-
tributed to the precise tax from which the state had paid the subsidy
in issue to nonpublic schools. However, that same plaintiff was not
permitted to raise equal protection issues claiming an adverse effect
from the litigated subsidy upon Negro children in the public schools, be-
cause his children had neither applied for, nor been denied admission
to, a nonpublic school.
The immediate result of Flast was to at least crack the door to
judicial testing of federal expenditures under the Establishment Clause.
Having acquired standing to sue in Flast, counsel there abandoned the
purpose of his case which was to test the Elementary and Secondary
Act of 1965,26 choosing instead to challenge the Higher Education
manded, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970),
aff'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House"-State Tuition Grants
for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARV. L. REX'. 1057, 1084 (1971).
23. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd and remanded,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in sections of 20, 42 U.S.C.).
U.S.C.).
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Facilities Act of 1963,2 7 in a three-judge federal court in Connecticut.2"
Since 1968, standing to sue has been modified to a point where it is
no longer considered an obstacle to bringing civil rights or church-state
issues before the courts. 9
Establishment Clause
The legal exegesis of the establishment clause began with Everson
v. Board of Education"0 in 1947. Of the twelve subsequent landmark
cases in this area, nine have dealt with education in the broadest sense
of the term. Of these, four have considered aid of various forms to
nonpublic schools, four have dealt with a nexus between religion and
public schools, and one was concerned with federal aid to church-re-
lated colleges and universities. The following is an abbreviated table
of the pertinent cases:






















- 1 Bus Rides for Nonpublic
School Children
Released Time Program On
Public School Premises
2 - Released Time Program Off
Public School Premises
3 - Prayer in Public Schools
4 - Bible Reading in Public
Schools
- 2 Textbooks for Nonpublic
School Pupils
- 3 Teacher Salary Supple-
ments for Nonpublic Schools
- 4 Purchase of Services from
Nonpublic Schools
- 5 Aid to Church-Related
Higher Education
27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-21, 751-58 (1970).
28. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970), vacated and remanded,
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
29. See Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
30. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Neutrality
In Everson we find the celebrated dictum which undertook to clar-
ify the establishment of religion clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
• . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.
31
It was apparently an unequivocal introduction to the sensitive subject
of aid to sectarian schools, but it has had the unhappy history of having
been invoked by advocates on both sides of the issue of what consti-
tutes aid. The Court sustained a state tax supported program for the
reimbursement of funds spent by parents for the bus transportation of
their children to public or Catholic parochial schools. The Court ad-
mitted the
possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's
bus fares out of their own pockets when transportation to a public
school would have been paid for by the State.
32
Busing was classified, with such things as the furnishing of police and
fire protection and of water and sewage services, as "public welfare
legislation" which provides services "indisputably marked off from the
religious function" of the schools. 33  Thus, the Court was considered
to have gone to the threshold of the sectarian school with aid; the con-
stitutionality of the issue rested at this point until twenty-one years
later when the Court heard the Allen case concerning state supplied
textbooks for nonpublic school children.3" In Everson and later in
Allen, the Court approved state aid to nonpublic school children and
parents. Varying forms of direct federal assistance 35 to nonpublic
schools were not issues before the Court. The constitutional test of
such aid in recent Supreme Court cases had concentrated rather on
31. Id. at 15-16.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 17-18.
34. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
35. Federal programs providing secular assistance at the elementary and second-
ary level include: National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1752, 1755, 1758, 1761
(1970); National Defense Education Act of 1958, 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-602 (1970); Man-
power Development and Training Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-626 (1970); Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-994 (1970); Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44(a) (1970).
[Vol. 23
THE COURT AND NONPUBLIC EDUCATION
the tests or safeguards surrounding federal and state aid to nonpublic
schools.
Religion in the Public Schools
In 1948 the Court, in McCollum,36 declared unconstitutional the
Champaign Plan under which weekly classes in religious instruction
were offered in public school buildings to public school pupils whose
parents requested that they be permitted to attend. Instruction was
given by religious teachers, at no expense to school authorities, but
instructors were subject to the approval and supervision of the super-
intendent of schools.
By contrast, in 1952 the Court, in Zorach,37 upheld a "released-
time" program whereby public schools in New York, on receipt of
written requests from parents, released students before the close of the
school day so that they might attend religious instruction or devotional
services on religious premises. In 1962 the Court, in Engel v. Vitale,
38
declared unconstitutional the mandatory daily recitation of a prescribed
prayer by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each
school day. Finally, in the fourth'of the schooling and religion cases,
in 1963 the Court, in Schempp,89 struck down a Pennsylvania statute
requiring a daily reading of at least ten verses from the Bible in public
schools.
To many, the combined decisions in McCollum, Engel and
Schempp would appear to foreclose the subject of religion where public
schools are concerned. This interpretation is unduly restrictive and, in
fact, unwarranted on a close reading of those opinions.
In McCollum the Court addressed itself specifically to the utiliza-
tion of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to
aid religious groups to spread their faith.40  The Court found that a
state could not consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments
utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects
in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals.41 Four members of
the Court found that the State of Illinois had "authorized the com-
mingling of sectarian with secular instruction in the public schools. '42
36. Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
37. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
38. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
39. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948).
41. Id. at 210.
42. Id. at 212 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
March 19721
In Engel the Court undertook to preclude government officials
from composing "modes of worship" or prayers for use in public
schools, regardless of the brevity, simplicity or denominational neu-
trality of their devotional compositions. The Court saw fit to dis-
tinguish school exercises, which, though religiously oriented to some
degree, it considered primarily patriotic or ceremonial rather than re-
ligious.
The Schempp case proscribed the use of the Bible as an instru-
ment of religious ceremony or observance in the public schools of
Pennsylvania. The Court rejected the contention of counsel "that
the Bible is here used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral
inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects."43
These decisions-which ruled on the teaching of sectarian religion,
school prayer and Bible reading in public schools-underscore the in-
extricable links between religion and the cultural life of the nation.
Thus the Engel majority opinion finds "[tlhe history of man is insep-
arable from the history of religion."44  Similarly, in Zorach Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote in the majority opinion: "We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."4  In Schempp we
read: "It is true that religion has been closely identified with our his-
tory and government."'"
How then, it might well be asked, can a student in public school
imbibe the full historical and literary inheritance of our society without
exposure to the religious values which infused the life of the nation?
The question seems to have been anticipated. In McCollum, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter stated, "We do not consider, as indeed we could not,
school programs not before us . . . . "' Speaking of the Champaign
Plan, the same concurring opinion of four justices states: "The courses
do not profess to give secular instruction in subjects concerning re-
ligion. Their candid purpose is sectarian teaching.148  Thus, the Court
contemplates the concept of secular or nonsectarian religion. The con-
stitutional propriety of teaching about religion is more clearly enunci-
ated in the Schempp opinion:
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete with-
out a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and
its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly
43. 374 U.S. at 224.
44. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
45. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
46. 374 U.S. at 212.
47. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
48. Id. at 226.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
March 1972] THE COURT AND NONPUBLIC EDUCATION 975
may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as
part of a secular program of education, may not be effected con-
sistently with the First Amendment.
49
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, said:
The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teach-
ing about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences between
religious sects in classes in literature or history. Indeed, whether or
not the Bible is involved, it would be impossible to teach meaning-
fully many subjects in the social sciences or the humanities with-
out some mention of religion. To what extent, and at what points
in the curriculum, religious materials should be cited are matters
which the courts ought to entrust very largely to the experienced
officials who superintend our Nation's public schools. They are
the experts in such matters, and we are not.50
Consequently, teaching about religion from purely cultural, historical
or literary perspectives is permissible within the constitutional frame-
work of the First Amendment. A public school program of studies in
comparative religion with a secular purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion would pass muster on the
Schempp test, observe the neutrality of Everson, and avoid the church-
state entanglements proscribed in the church-tax exemption case of
Walz.51
In at least four states, there exist public school courses that "teach
about religion." 52 The history of the Judaeo-Christian heritage, world
religions, the philosophy of religion and the Bible as literature are
among the courses being taught in English, social studies, and other
curriculum areas in public schools. The training of teachers in cul-
tural areas of religion in secular universities is showing signs of expan-
sion. 3 The scholarly publication by ecumenical experts of books suited
to nonsectarian studies in religion is lending momentum to this devel-
opment.
5 4
49. 374 U.S. at 225.
50. Id. at 300.
51. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
52. Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Florida and Indiana might be considered to have ex-
ceeded the experimental stages that included collaboration between state departments of
education and state university departments of education and religion, the production of
suitable curriculum, the training of teachers in religious subject matter, and initial ex-
perimental teaching about religion in public school classrooms.
53. Workshops, institutes and courses to prepare teachers to teach religion in pub-
lic schools have been expanding and gaining enrollments. The most widely known pro-
grams appear to be at Florida State University at Tallahassee, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity at University Park and Indiana University at Bloomington.
54. E.g., W. AmOT'r, A. GILBERT, R. HUNT & J. SwAIN, THE BmILE READER
Aid to Nonpublic Education
In June of 1968, the Court, in the Allen case, upheld a New
York law requiring each local public school district to lend textbooks
free of charge "to all children residing in such district who are enrolled
in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school."55  This case
established an important precedent by constitutionally escorting public
aid beyond the door of the nonpublic school. Once the concept of a
secular textbook in a private or sectarian school was accepted by the
Court and its subsidization declared constitutional, arguments in favor
of secular teachers and unlimited educational services were predict-
able. 6
Allen, though focused on the specific issue of textbooks, was in
fact the first constitutional test of federal aid. By the time of the deci-
sion, in approximately thirty states (including New York), an opinion
had been issued by the local State Attorney General categorizing ESEA
funds as federal all the way to the beneficiary, and, as such, immune to
any strictures in state constitutions or legislative enactments to the con-
trary.
57
Justice White in the Allen majority opinion, applied the Schempp
test and found that the New York law had "a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."58
The opinion saw in the law the authorization of secular books only
and assumed the criterion that books lent to students in private schools
"are books that are not unsuitable for use in the public schools because
of religious content."59  The court refined the appellant's contention
that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that "the processes
of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular text-
books furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in
(1969), which is edited by a Jesuit, two protestant ecumenical scholars and a rabbi; E.
GAUSTAD, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA (1966).
55. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1969).
56. Duffy, The Textbook Case, 29 THE JURIST 279, 290 (1969).
57. Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in its original
form contemplated outright grants to public and nonpublic schools for supplies and
equipment. Considerable opposition modified its terms so as to channel federal funds
through the states to the school district which in the case of textbooks, purchased the
books and lent them to school children. There was constitutional precedent for this pro-
cedure in Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), where it was held that a
state plan to provide textbooks to parochial school students did not violate the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
58. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
59. Id. at 245.
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the teaching of religion," by adding: "Nothing in this record supports
the proposition that all textbooks, whether they deal with mathematics,
physics, foreign languages, history or literature, are used by the paro-
chial schools to teach religion." 60
Of the two most recent cases on aid to nonpublic schools before
the Supreme Court, Lemon v. Kurtzman6 challenged the constitution-
ality of Pennsylvania's 1968 Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Act." The act provided that all of the proceeds from a certain
tax on horse racing up to $10 million, and one half of all the proceeds
in excess of $10 million should, under the direction of the Superintend-
ent of Public Instruction, be used for reimbursement to nonpublic
schools for the "purchase of secular educational services." 63  Secular
services are defined as consisting of courses in mathematics, modem
foreign languages, physical science and physical education. The reim-
bursement is limited to the actual cost to a nonpublic school of the
teacher's salaries, textbooks and the instructional material used in the
teaching of courses in those four categories.
The act required that the textbooks and instructional materials
be approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, that a satis-
factory level of pupil performance shall have been attained, and made
provisions respecting teacher certification in nonpublic schools. The
application for reimbursement and the payments themselves were to
take place after the close of the year in which the teaching occurred.
The act directed that the payments be made directly to the school itself
and the school accounts were made subject to state audit. No payment
was to be made for any course containing "any subject matter express-
ing religious teaching." There were no civil rights provisions in the act.
In Lemon the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, voting 2 to 1, upheld the constitutionality of the act,
granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. The two judge majority ruled that the purpose and primary
effect of the act were secular and that any incidental benefit to the sec-
tarian schools was not an infringement of the First Amendment.
In DiCenso v. Robinson 4 the issue was the constitutionality of
60. Id. at 248.
61. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd & remanded, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971).
63. Id. § 5606 (repealed 1970). This section was replaced by section 5606.1
which was to siphon 14 percent of the cigarette tax revenues into the Nonpublic Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Fund.
64. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
March 1972]
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Rhode Island's Salary Supplement Act of 1969. The State of Rhode
Island appropriated $375,000 from the state's general treasury for a
15 percent salary supplement for eligible teachers in nonpublic ele-
mentary schools under the following terms:
Every nonpublic schoolteacher shall, upon his or her request, be
paid by the state through the commissioner of education, a salary
supplement in the amount fixed by law in such installments and
at such intervals as shall be fixed by regulation promulgated by
the commissioner of education. As a condition for the payment
of such salary supplement the commissioner of education shall be
satisfied that the teacher:
1. Is one who teaches in any grade from grade one through
grade eight exclusively only those subjects required to be taught by
state law to the same extent as those subjects are taught in public
schools, or which are provided in public schools throughout the
state, or any other subjects that are taught in public schools.
2. Has a teaching certificate issued by or under the authority
of the state board of education in substantially the same manner
that such certificates are issued to teachers in public schools.
3. Is receiving a salary which, including the salary supple-
ment, meets the minimum salary standards for public schools re-
quired for eligibility under title 16, chapter 7 of the general laws
of Rhode Island.
4. Is using only teaching materials which are used in the
public schools of the state.
5. Is one who does not teach a course in religion and who
signs a statement in which he or she promises not to teach a
course in religion for so long as or during such time as he or she
receives any salary supplements provided for under the provisions
of this chapter.6 5
On June 15, 1970, a three judge district court held this act uncon-
stitutional. The court found the standing of the taxpayer-plaintiffs
well settled. On the merits, all three judges ruled that operation of the
Salary Supplement Act involved those "reciprocal embroilments of gov-
ernment and religion which the First Amendment was meant to
avoid." 66 Two judges also held that the effect of the act was to sub-
stantially support a religious enterprise in contravention of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
The Lemon and DiCenso cases were appealed to the Supreme Court
where they were consolidated and decided on June 28, 1971. The
opinion of the Court summarizes the provisions of both the Rhode Is-
land and the Pennsylvania statutes before it, together with the findings
65. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970).
66. 316 F. Supp. at 122.
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of the lower courts in each case. Then the Court with the customary
acknowledgment of the grey constitutional areas surrounding the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment underscored the word "respect-
ing" in the Establishment Clause. "A given law might not establish
a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence
offend the First Amendment."6 From the Walz case which was con-
trolling in this opinion, the Court repeats the three main evils against
which the Establishment Clause was designed to afford protection,
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity."68
The Court then gleaned three tests from former cases:
-A statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
-A statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
-A statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.
Heretofore, the first two tests were known as the Schempp test as
applied in the Allen textbook case of 1968 and the third test was de-
vised in the Walz tax exemption case of 1970.
The Court found the respective legislative purposes of Pennsyl-
vania and Rhode Island to be secular. However, it found both primary
effects that advance religion and a fostering of church-state entangle-
ments in each case. The third test of entanglement predominates
throughout the opinion. Thus, the separation that proved to be a
church boon in tax exemption became a barrier in aid to church-related
schools.
A section of the opinion is devoted to a working definition and
an application of the Walz church-state entanglement test. Recogniz-
ing the impossibility of total church-state separation, the Court cites
"fire inspections, building and zoning regulations and state require-
ments under compulsory school attendance laws" as examples of "nec-
essary and permissible contacts." If these examples are to be inter-
preted strictly, the enforcement of federal, state and municipal laws,
rules, and regulations are the only permissible constitutional bases of
church-state contacts. The criteria used by the Court to measure the
degree of entanglement in the cases before it were:
67. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis added).
68. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
-the character and purpose of the institutions benefited;
-the nature of the aid that the state provides;
-the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority.
In applying its own criteria to the findings of the district court in Rhode
Island, the opinion outlines what the Court conceives to be the re-
ligious purpose of sectarian schools, the means employed to attain that
purpose, and attendant circumstances that constitute a religious at-
mosphere in sectarian schools.
Recognizing with the district court that "religious values did not
inevitably or necessarily intrude into the content of secular subjects,"
the Court looked to the "careful governmental controls and surveil-
lance" prescribed by state authorities "to ensure that state aid supports
only secular education" as, at least, anticipation by the legislature of
the entanglement.
The Court specifically lists bus transportation, school lunches,
public health services and secular textbooks as secular, neutral, or non-
ideological services, facilities, or materials which were not thought to
offend the Establishment Clause in decisions in Everson and Allen.
In the context of religious neutrality, a distinction is made between
textbooks and teachers on the grounds that "a textbook's content is
ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not." To under-
score "the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline
poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects
of pre-college education," the Court examines the religious authority
structure, staff composition and norms 69 which obtain in schools in the
Diocese of Providence, Rhode Island. Given those cumulative circum-
stances, the Court finds the notion of a neutral teacher in a Catholic
school constitutionally hazardous with the teacher's responsibilities hov-
ering "on the border between secular and religious instruction."
State aid cannot be provided on:
the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers under religious
discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain, given
the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate re-
ligion-indeed the State here has undertaken to do so. 70
The Court does not accept the state's conditions guaranteeing neu-
trality because it feels that:
69. Gleaned by the Court from a "Handbook of School Regulations" which was
promulgated by the Diocesan Superintendent of Schools and binding with the force of
synodal law in the Diocese.
70. 403 U.S. at 619.
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Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to deter-
mine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and sub-
jective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amend-
ment.
71
Furthermore, and this would appear to be the essence of this
opinion, the very precautions taken by the state to insure that state aid
will be surrounded by religious neutrality become themselves the sort
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. The auditing and ex-
amination of school records and personnel by the "comprehensive, dis-
criminating, and continuing state surveillance .. . required to ensure
that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected," become "a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive
government direction of church schools and hence of churches. 7 - Such
involvement in church schools constitutes the "excessive entanglements"
of Walz.
Turning to the Pennsylvania statute the Court does not repeat the
application of its criteria because it finds "an educational system that
is very similar to the one existing in Rhode Island" with similar pur-
poses, and as a consequence of state aid, similar effects and church-
state entanglements.
Nevertheless, in this section of the opinion, the Court distinguishes
Everson and Allen from the Pennsylvania statute on the grounds that
the former aid by way of transportation and textbooks was "provided
to the student and his parents," whereas the Pennsylvania, statute pro-
vides "state financial aid directly to the church-related school." Con-
sonant with this distinction, the Court repeats its warning in Walz:
Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs,
could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships
for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards. .... 73
The directness of aid test will probably become the constitutional
standard emerging from this opinion.
The Court expanded the base of entanglement to include "the
divisive political potential of these state programs," thereby raising po-
litical divisiveness to the level of a constitutional criterion. The Court
acknowledged its former espousal by the late Justice Harlan and former
Justice Goldberg and Professor Freund. It was also embraced by
Judge Hastie in his dissenting opinion in the Lemon case. The Court
71. Id.
72. Id. at 620.
73. Id. at 621, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
made two significant allusions in this context, the one to the history of
many countries attesting to "the hazards of religion intruding into the
political arena' and the other to the relatively few religious groups
benefiting by the appropriations before the Court.14  Briefly, the Court
does not favor the injection of state aid to church-related schools into
political elections or legislatures in the United States lest political deci-
sions would be influenced by sheer numerical strength of advocates or
proponents.
In the final section of the opinion the Court adopted the progres-
sion argument rejected in Walz. This argument is premised on the
view that "modern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and
self-expanding propensities." The Court considered the state aid pro-
grams before it as innovative to the extent that they constituted a de-
parture from the Everson transportation and Allen textbook benefits to
students and parents.
The Court pays a generous tribute to the enormous contribution
of church-related elementary and secondary schools to our national
life and concludes by restating its position on aid to these schools:
Under our system the choice has been made that government is
to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and
churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitu-
tion decrees that religion must be a private matter for the indi-
vidual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that
while some involvement and entanglement is inevitable, lines must
be drawn.15
Conclusions
The present forms of state aid to nonpublic schools that survive
Lemon and DiCenso are perhaps best summarized in the words of the
Court:
Our decisions from Everson to Alien have permitted the States to
provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or nonideolog-
ical services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school
lunches, public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in
74. See DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), afJ'd sub nor.
403 U.S. 602 (1971), where the district court found that about 25% of the state's ele-
mentary students attended nonpublic schools, about 95% of whom attended Roman
Catholic affiliated schools, and that to date about 250 teachers at Roman Catholic
schools are the sole beneficiaries under the Act. 315 F. Supp. at 14-15. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd & remanded, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
where contracts were made with nonpublic schools which have more than 20% of all
students in the state, most of which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.
75. Id. at 625.
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common to all students were not thought to offend the Establish-
ment Clause.7"
In the following words the Court added a crucial condition to its fore-
going permissible secular or religiously neutral services, facilities and
materials:
The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of pro-
viding state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This
factor distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in both cases the
Court was careful to point out that state aid was provided to the
student and his parents-not to the church-related school.
77
Accordingly, it would appear to be a constitutional formula that in the
case of auxiliary services, as they are sometimes termed, all such state
benefits to nonpublic education must be secular and directly conferred
on all students and parents.
Legislatibn enacted or proposed in thirteen states78 similar to that
of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have been adversely affected by
this latest Supreme Court decision. What is not readily apparent is the
fate of varied state-proposed or enacted legislative programs of assist-
ance to nonpublic schools that include tuition grants, voucher plans,
scholarships, tax deductions and exemptions, dual enrollment, shared
facilities, shared personnel and similar forms of aid.
It would seem gratuitous to assume that tuition grants, voucher
plans, scholarships and tax credits, conform to the standards set in
Lemon because they confer benefits on students and parents directly,
thus avoiding the prohibition of direct aid to nonpublic schools. Legis-
lation involving these elements must also avoid secular-religious distinc-
tions that would entail state supervision thereby giving rise to church-
state entanglement. Additionally, the state may not provide public
money for unspecified use in a school with a purpose or mission to trans-
mit a faith to children of "an impressionable age." This is the quan-
dary confronting legislative drafting that would channel state aid to the
nonpublic school student or parent. Although education grants to par-
ents in varied forms 9 are advocated in the public sector of education,
the Court's exclusively religious definition of a church-related school
in its latest opinion renders it impossible to equate any of its curricular
76. Id. at 616-17.
77. Id. at 621.
78. National Catholic Education Ass'n, State Aid to Nonpublic Schools, as of
May 15, 1971 (1971).
79. See Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System
for Voucher Plans, 59 CAiF. L. REv. 321 (1971); THE CENTnR FOR THE STUDY OF
PUBLIC POLICY, FINANCING EDUCATION By GRANTS TO PARENTS (1970).
areas with those in the public school for the purpose of common state
subsidy or financing plans.
Dual enrollment has not been a subject of church-state litigation.
The Court in the past has upheld the right of a student to attend a
private or a public school. In the absence of legal challenge and a de-
cision to the contrary, it appears to be commonly accepted that students
may distribute their time between public and private schools, electing
to attend courses in both.
By contrast, shared facilities and shared personnel are issues pres-
ently before lower courts.80 At stake in these cases are such arrange-
ments as the leasing of nonpublic school facilities to the public schools
for the conducting of classes by public school teachers for students en-
rolled at the church-related school and the contracting of public school
teachers to nonpublic schools at public expense. Basically, they amount
to lease and contract arrangements between public and nonpublic
schools. It is difficult to see how these accommodations can withstand
the entanglement test applied to Lemon and DiCenso. A more imme-
diate practical question may arise as to whether church-related schools
may be leased to public schools with churches retaining the right to use
the premises for the purpose of teaching religion at times other than
during public school hours. This arrangement on its face would ap-
pear to fall afoul of the 1948 McCollum decision forbidding the use of
public school property for the purpose of teaching religion."'
Underlying all measures of state aid to nonpublic schools will be
the consideration of political divisiveness. This criterion has been
raised to the status of a constitutional standard. It has the potential
to imperil all forms of aid other than those in direct social and neutral
services condoned by the Court. It is correlated with the degree of
opposition generated against any measure of state aid to nonpublic
schools. It is closely linked to the progression argument whereby on-
going and increasing measures of a given form of aid would constitute
a "self-expanding and self-perpetuating" religious issue in the political
arena.
80. Smith v. Fitzgerald School Dist., Circuit Court for the County of Macomb
(Michigan, filed June 26, 1969); Citizens to Advance Public Educ. v. Porter, Circuit
Court for the County of Ingham (Michigan, filed Dec. 18, 1969); Montana ex rel.
Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10, (D. Mont. filed May 20, 1969); Fisher v. School Dist.
No. 1, Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Clackamas (filed Jan.
14, 1970).
81. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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It may be added that although the charge of denial of equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds of racial
discrimination only merited a footnote in the Lemon majority opinion,
the issue bids fair to receiving more attention in future state aid to non-
public school cases. The nonpublic school has become a euphemism82
with varying definitions depending on social and geographical circum-
stances. Cases now pending in lower courts against private and sec-
tarian schools charging them with racial discrimination are apt to merit
the Court's attention in the not too distant future. The outcome will
doubtless add another constitutional rider to any and all forms of state
aid to the nonpublic sector of education.
Some significant features of this latest church-state decision on
aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools merit special atten-
tion. The vote in the Pennsylvania case was 8-0 and in the Rhode
Island case 8-1. This decisiveness in voting speaks for itself and it
contrasts sharply with the 5-4 decision in Tilton 3 granting aid to non-
public higher education. Should the Court later attempt to reconcile
the disparities between its opinion denying state aid to nonpublic pri-
mary and secondary schools in Lemon and DiCenso and its reasons for
granting federal aid to nonpublic higher education in Tilton it is not
conjecture to assume that their unanimity in the former may average
out to become a reversal of Tilton, that is, unless Catholic and other
denominational colleges and universities sever all but nominal eccle-
siastical identification as illustrated in the history of the Ivy League
universities."4
For the first time, the Court exceeded its criterion of secular legis-
lative purpose to examine also the religious purposes of parochial ele-
mentary and secondary education. This piercing of the ecclesiastical
veil created a radical precedent on the part of the Court. In this ex-
cursion behind the wall, the Court found a Catholic hierarchical struc-
ture and at least a theoretical philosophy of what Catholic education
ought to be. As a result, the Court embraced the doctrine of religious
permeation. This factor should eliminate future arguments for aid
based on secularity at the expense of a religious philosophy of educa-
tion. That religion permeated the curriculum of denominational
82. See Kurland, The Clouded Crystal Ball: The Supreme Court on Government
Aid to Parochial Schools, 79 SCHOOL RIv. 325, 348 (1971).
83. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn.), vacated & remanded sub
nom. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
84. See Hooper & Pinkerton, Harvard University, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA Bprr-
TANICA 138 (1971).
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schools has been vigorously argued in the past by opponents of aid to
nonpublic schools. The strength of their arguments derived from offi-
cial documents of the denominations whose schools would benefit from
governmental aid. Catholic bishops, writers, and educators have con-
tinually repeated the norm of Pope Pius XI "that every . . . subject
taught, be permeated with Christian piety."8' 5 The Supreme Court
found this ideal reflected in the Manual of the Superintendent of
Schools in the Diocese of Providence, a diocese which is coterminus
with the State of Rhode Island. The Court was thus confronted by the
Catholic Church arguing the secularity of part of its educational enter-
prise while remaining officially and, at least theoretically, committed to
religious permeation in its philosophy of Catholic education.
Ideally, the Catholic Church in the United States should approach
the Supreme Court with aims and objectives in education that reflect
internal consensus and consistency. This unity would hardly be pos-
sible even if the Court were conceivably examining the religious doc-
trine curriculum itself which is taught in the Catholic schools of any
given diocese. At one end of the opinion scale on Catholic education
one finds a repeated obsessive loyalty to a theocentric curriculum which
can even spawn such esoteric preoccupations as metaphysical misgiv-
ings about the new math.8" Some affiliation with this philosophical
camp and unswerving loyalty to Catholic education are still indispen-
sable attributes to episcopal promotion in the United States Catholic
Church. At the other extremes are the liberal proponents of Catholic
schools with a small "c" or just Catholic opponents of Catholic schools.
All denominations with primary and secondary schools have a
stated purpose of having their curricula reflect their religious values.8 7
Were it otherwise the burden would seem to be on the denominational
school to justify its role in education.88 It is precisely in defense of
religious objectives that some religious denominations have refused to
accept governmental aid and have filed briefs opposing such aid. 9 Log-
85. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Divini Illius Magistri (1929); On The Christian
Education of Youth 12-16 (National Catholic Welfare Conference transl.) (1930).
86. M. Werner, An Educational Analysis of Certain Philosophical Implications in
Modern Mathematics (1968) (unpublished dissertation in The Catholic University).
87. See G. LA NOUE, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS? 31 (1963).
88. The first publication to raise a national internal debate within the Catholic
Church in the United States on the fulfillment of Catholic purposes in Catholic schools
was published by M. RYAN, ARE PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS THE ANSWER? (1963). See also
Deedy, Should Catholic Schools Survive?, NEW REPUBLIC Mar. 13, 1971, at 15; Fried-
man & Binzen, Politics and Parochiaid, id. Jan. 23, 1971, at 12.
89. The Jewish National League and Seventh Day Adventists together with some
branches of other denominations have traditionally opposed government aid.
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ically it would seem that conservative Catholic leaders should have filed
a brief opposing state "purchase of secular services" in Catholic schools
in Pennsylvania.
While the Court condoned the auxiliary services already men-
tioned, it found open-ended programs of aid like those of Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island unacceptable. This leaves only integral, one-shot
forms of aid and constitutes a severe restriction. The Court referred
specifically to the expanding and self-perpetuating tendencies of govern-
ment in the distribution of public funds. If European history has any
relevance, however, demand would be commensurate with supply in
this instance. In Lemon the Church presented the State of Pennsyl-
vania and the Court with an argument based on the secularity of mathe-
matics, modern foreign languages, physical science and physical edu-
cation.90 In effect this argument erases distinction between public and
nonpublic schools in these four areas of curriculum which comprise a
sizeable segment of school instruction. The state and the Court could
reasonably anticipate that the Church would be back to argue the secu-
larity of its instruction in English, home economics, social science, com-
mercial training or the remainder of grade and high school areas of in-
struction. Parity of support in all instruction areas save religion would
be the ultimate objective in subject subsidy. Given the free neutral
textbook aid granted in Allen, the Court could not have accepted the
secularity of Lemon without foreseeing accumulative subject subsidy
and future Church arguments based on the neutrality and secularity of
a desk, blackboard, ceiling, floor and four walls together with all the
educational appurtenances needed for a purely secular educational en-
terprise under private ecclesiastical control.
The Court's expressed concern over the political divisiveness that
attends governmental appropriations for nonpublic schools envisaged
a protracted political struggle for complete federal and state subsidiza-
tion of a private reproduction of the public school system with some
form of religious instruction and exercises attached. The Court's allu-
sion in these contexts to the history of other countries"' is significant.
England provides an example of what the Court had in mind. De-
nominational schools, the vast majority of which are Roman Catholic,
have reached the 75 percent mark on their journey to full government
subsidy. The struggle toward this goal has spanned the present cen-
tury. It is credited with having threatened major rifts at the national
90. See 310 F. Supp. at 46.
91. 403 U.S. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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level in political parties and became an ingredient of many political
election campaigns2 2 Resulting compromises constitute a chronology
of continued increasing increments in government subsidization of de-
nominational schools.
The rise of private denominational schools subsidized by the Neth-
erlands Government has been in direct proportion to the decline in the
number of public schools in that country. In 1850, 77 percent of pri-
mary pupils in the Netherlands attended public and 23 percent attended
private primary schools. In 1969 these figures were almost totally
reversed with 26 percent of Dutch pupils attending public and 74 per-
cent attending private primary schools. 3 Similarly 1969 attendance
figures for secondary schools in the Netherlands show 29,746 students
in public and 176,823 students in private secondary schools. 9 The
struggle over the schools established the major lines of the Dutch party
system. The "vertical pluralism" and "columnizing" effects of denomi-
national schools in the Netherlands have been a subject of study by both
Dutch and foreign scholars. 5
In invoking the potential of political divisiveness inherent in pro-
grams of aid to church-related schools, the Court stopped at the
threshold of the argument of social divisiveness which is often invoked
against Catholic schools in pluralistic societies. Within the Catholic
Church in the United States the question was raised before the turn
of the century by the eminent intellectual Church leader, Archbishop
John Ireland.96  Recent major sociological studies17 have attempted to
refute the recurring charge of social divisiveness but it continues to be
92. See Duffy, Religion and Education in England, the Netherlands, Scotland and
Sweden, in THE COLLAPSE OF NONPUBLIC EDUCATION: RUMOR OR REALITY?; 11 The
Report on Nonpublic Education in the State of New York (The Fleischman Report) for
the New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Elementary
and Secondary Education, c-122 (1971).
93. P.J. Idenburg, Schets van het Nederlandse Schoolwezen 118-19 (1964) in A.
CLAYTON, RELIGION AND SCHOOLING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 143 (1969).
94. NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION REPORT: FOR THE YEAR
1969 45 (1970).
95. See Clayton, supra note 93, at 114-30.
96. IRELAND, STATE SCHOOLS AND PARISH SCHOOLS, in THE CHURCH IN MODERN
SOCIETY 199-214 (2d ed. 1897).
97. See J. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 116 (1958);
A. GREELEY & P. RossI, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC AMERICANS (1966); Greeley,
Rossi, & Pinto, THr SOCIAL EFFECTS OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION (1964); Rossi & Ross,
Some Effects of Parochial School Education in America, 90 DAEDALUS 300 (1961);
Rossi & Rossi, Backgrounds and Consequences of Parochial School Education, HARV.
EDUC. REV. 195 (1957).
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reinforced by overseas illustrations. Denominational schools are con-
sidered by critics to have been a contributing factor to the recent spectre
of religious polarization in Northern Ireland. If the position of the
public schools in the United States becomes imperiled by proposals
such as the voucher system9" the concept of social divisiveness is apt
to lose its parochial context and assume national dimensions that may
merit the attention of the Court in the not too distant future.
Ironically and perforce, Catholics are returning to the public
schools at a time when the public schools' function and fulfillment are
undergoing reassessment. It is to be hoped that the judiciary already
has, and that the executive and legislative branches of federal and state
government will, together with public and private leaders in education,
view and meet the challenge of the Lemon and DiCenso decisions in
terms that transcend the purely monetary. With sincere condolences,
the Supreme Court has accorded a full-dress constitutional burial to the
ad terrorem economic arguments in favor of aid to nonpublic schools.
98. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
